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7International Corruption
Organized Civil Society for Better Global Governance
Peter Eigen
Transparency International
The theme of this issue, and the conference with which it is connected, is 
most timely. Corruption is the most talked about global problem around the 
world. Grand corruption in the global economy, petty corruption at home 
and abroad, corruption in politics, economic development, science, media, 
medicine, international and national corruption: the cancer of corruption 
seems to be everywhere and unending.
My focus here is on international corruption because it is particularly 
pernicious. It also lends itself to illustrating the failure of global governance. 
It is both a consequence of failed global governance and one of the con-
tributing factors to this failure. At the same time, international corruption 
is an area where a new paradigm of global governance is clearly needed.
I see a constructive role for organized civil society in tackling poor 
governance and international corruption where the traditional actors of 
governance—national governments and their intergovernmental institu-
tions—have proved to be helpless. I am speaking of civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs) such as Transparency International (TI), which through their 
interaction with other actors of governance—mainly governments and 
business—have managed to make a tangible difference in the global fight 
against corruption. I founded TI in 1993 in Berlin, and will speak from 
my practical experiences as longtime chair of TI and founding chair of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
Through the empowerment of civil society organizations, it is my hope 
that similar outcomes can be achieved in many other areas of failing gov-
ernance, whether they be human rights violations, the destruction of the 
environment, or the violation of fair labor standards.
Failing Global Governance
The present paradigm of global governance is based on the key role of 
sovereign nation-states and their governments. This near exclusive reliance 
on nation-states is outdated. The globalization of the economy has surpassed 
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the capacity of national governments to regulate the economy. National 
governments simply do not have the global reach that would be required 
to govern the global economy. I would point to at least three dimensions 
of asymmetry that make it nearly impossible for national governments to 
establish a coherent system of governance:
• Limited geographical reach of national governments: while  
business is operating with few binding constraints in a world-
wide market, government authority is largely limited to their 
respective territories.
• Time-bound government terms: governments, in particular 
those that are democratic, have to serve their voters’ interests in 
a relatively short time period, while most of the global issues—
such as climate change—have to be addressed with a long-term 
approach.
• Government constituencies: the constituencies of national 
governments are often scattered and diverse, with many different 
interests—and therefore demands on their governments—other 
than global issues.
The nation-state paradigm is as a result only partly functional in a 
globalized economy. This is also largely true for their intergovernmental 
organizations (including the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and United Nations agencies), where member nations often pursue 
their national agendas. Of course, it is legitimate and to be expected that 
these organizations carry out the wishes of their member nations, but this 
too often happens to be the lowest common denominator.
Hence, there is no coherent, overarching authority that could install 
what we in Germany proudly call a Soziale Marktwirtschaft, a social mar-
ket economy, where good governance can protect the functioning of the 
market (against corruption and the abuse of private power, for example) 
or even correct the outcome of the market forces where they are socially 
unacceptable. At present the primacy of politics over markets has been lost.
We need a new paradigm of global governance. The outcome of the 
present system is marked by governance failure—at the global, regional, 
and local levels.
Can the world accept an outcome that condemns a billion people to 
absolute poverty? A billion people without reasonable access to drinking 
water? Twice that number of people living without proper sanitation? Year 
after year, 6.6 million children die before the age of five, mainly because 
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of banal, poverty-related diseases (UNDP HDR 2013). Can we accept the 
conflicts, violence, and terror arising from failing governance in so many 
regions and countries, including eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Syria? Millions of innocent people die because 
of failing governance; hundreds of millions are refugees.
The record is clear; our present global governance functions badly. In 
fact, the people on the streets of Madrid, Cairo, Athens, Tunis, and New 
York have told us: we need change.
Alternative Governance Scenarios
It has sometimes been suggested that the private sector, especially global 
companies, should take on a stronger role for better global governance. 
This is because—provided they can be relied on to apply “corporate social 
responsibility”—they have the global reach, the global strategies, the long-
term perspective, and the invisible hand of the “market” as reliable referee 
(although according to Amartya Sen, it is an invisible referee “nowhere to 
be seen” when needed).
The proponents of this alternative have grown quieter in recent years as 
an unfettered global marketplace allowed many bankers and other global 
business people to bring untold misery to the world. And indeed, who 
would give the leaders of these enterprises the skills, the mandate, even 
the incentives and interest to pursue the global public good? They are 
themselves subject to the short-term imperatives of the financial markets. 
They themselves need an enabling environment to implement corporate 
social responsibility; they themselves need good global governance.
A decisive governance role for the private sector cannot then be the 
answer. But I will argue later that there is indeed a broad role for business 
in good global governance. However, it must be embedded in an enabling 
environment for responsible corporate conduct. Such an environment must 
be shaped by society based on the primacy of politics over the market.
My positive message is that there may well be a powerful new actor: 
organized civil society. The ability and role of civil society, particularly 
organized civil society, in shaping global governance is increasingly rec-
ognized—not by replacing legitimate governments and their institutions 
but by complementing them in a triangular interaction of government, 
business, and civil society organizations.
International corruption is an excellent issue to illustrate the constructive 
impact of CSOs. Governments of the most powerful nations were helpless 
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against the dramatic growth of international corruption until the end of 
the 1990s, as were so many of the biggest enterprises in the world. How 
did CSOs make a difference?
Corruption: The Cause and Consequence of Failed Governance 
International corruption is endemic. The World Bank estimated that 
in 2001–2002, the equivalent of $1 trillion per year was paid in bribes 
worldwide, about 3 percent of world GDP (World Bank 2013). This is a 
huge amount, but the real damage is much more severe. For one thing, 
this estimate refers to the relatively narrow definition of the World Bank 
focusing on the public sector: “Corruption is the abuse of public office 
for private (economic) gain,” which leaves out the vast areas of (1) corrupt 
practices among private sector actors and (2) corruption focused on politi-
cal power rather than economic gain. The definition of TI includes these 
often overlapping types of corruption: “Corruption is the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain”; hence a much wider area of corruption is at stake.
But more important is that the amounts paid as bribes are only the tip of 
the iceberg of the damage caused. Corruption perverts economic manage-
ment, thereby causing untold misery, conflict, violence, and environmental 
destruction in the world. Extensive research has been conducted about 
the costs of corruption; the World Bank declared them in 2011 as “among 
the greatest obstacles to economic and social development” (World Bank 
2011). But this was after the World Bank had turned from Saul to Paul.
When, as director of the regional office for East Africa of the World Bank, 
I criticized rampant corruption in Africa in 1990, I was told to shut up. The 
legal department pointed to the charter of the World Bank, which made it 
illegal for the bank to meddle in the internal affairs of our partner countries; 
only “economic considerations” were allowed. The issue of corruption was in 
their opinion a strictly internal matter and, therefore, off limits in our strategies.
Of course, we had a fiduciary responsibility to protect the bank’s own 
projects and financial resources against misuse and waste. But even in 
the otherwise very detailed and rigorous procurement guidelines—which 
had been part of my responsibilities in an earlier stage of my World Bank 
career—the sanctions against corruption were couched in exceedingly soft 
terms, requiring a binding conviction for corruption in a local court before 
any of the customary sanctions against misprocurement were permitted.
Why did the World Bank at that time take this position? Because in 
most of its member countries foreign bribery was allowed. With the honor-
able exception of the United States, which had in 1977 introduced under 
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President Jimmy Carter the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), mak-
ing it a crime to bribe abroad, most other countries, in particular the 
rich Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
member countries, not only allowed their nationals to bribe abroad but 
also supported them with generous tax deductibility for bribes paid abroad. 
They also turned a blind eye to corruption under other support schemes, 
such as export financing and insurance.
The general consensus was that the globalized economy is largely without 
governance, and therefore companies willing and able to obtain business 
under this “free-for-all” system deserved rewards for their effective opera-
tions rather than criticism and obstacles, based on value systems that were 
far from universal. Even the more scrupulous countries and companies that 
recognized the destructive impact of international corruption on the affected 
societies—and in fact on the functioning of the market—felt constrained 
from following the American example of the FCPA because “everybody else 
was bribing.” It was therefore quite natural that the members of the World 
Bank used their voting power to block any activity that might embarrass 
their companies in their quest for business.
It was thus to be expected that I received in 1990 a memorandum from 
the legal department in Washington, DC, demanding that I immediately 
stop my improper efforts to control international corruption. I had given 
a passionate speech in front my colleagues at a staff retreat in Swaziland, 
proposing a task force for developing a systematic concept against interna-
tional corruption. Quite a number of them had agreed to join my initiative. 
We even had enlisted a number of African and European business leaders, 
who also felt they were victims of corruption.
My colleagues had all experienced the same frustration of rejecting 
bad project proposals because they were overdesigned, too expensive, or 
environmentally or socially harmful—but then seeing these same projects 
going ahead more rapidly than the good projects, which the donor com-
munity supported. Very often these poorly designed projects were driven 
by an unholy alliance of corrupt promoters from the global North and 
powerful kleptocrats in Africa. They were able to mobilize a consortium 
of banks with the help of export financing, often at higher interest rates 
and with higher total project costs. It is the sheer number of these types of 
white elephant projects that are at the root of the economic and financial 
failure in much of the developing world.
Our task force was determined to protect the people of Africa against 
the poverty and misery caused by their corrupt leaders. This is why the 
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memorandum of the legal department was such a great shock to us. The 
memo took the position that our idea of fighting corruption was not only 
illegal under the World Bank’s charter but that it was also naive and unpro-
fessional, and therefore we had to give this idea up immediately.
When I continued to promote the idea in my own free time, the president 
of the World Bank himself, Barber Conable, sent me a message pointing 
out that my anticorruption work, even if kept separate from my role of 
World Bank director, was embarrassing and had to stop. I had to leave the 
World Bank if I wanted to continue this work.
At about the same time, the German deputy minister of economic 
cooperation stopped two German development agencies, the Gesellschaft 
für technische Zusammenarbeit (GtZ) and the Stiftung für Internationale 
Entwicklung (DSE), from financing a first brainstorming session scheduled 
for 1990 in Berlin. Their managing directors, Hansjörg Elshorst and Peter 
Sötje respectively, had understood the devastating impact of systematic 
corruption, especially for people in the developing world, but their politi-
cal masters were not ready to stop German business from systematically 
bribing in the international marketplace.
Accordingly, my efforts to advance the anticorruption drive were met 
with hostility and ridicule in government and business circles, although my 
presentations at international conferences, particularly those organized by 
the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), found increasing support by leaders 
in the development community, including politicians and intellectuals from 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
Founding Transparency International
In early 1993 we felt that a critical mass for launching a civil society 
organization had been achieved. After creating a legal entity in the form 
of a German not-for-profit association (Gemeinnütziger Verein) with nine 
cofounders in the Maastricht office of Jan Pronk, then minister of develop-
ment of the Netherlands and cochair of the GCA, we invited about 40 
supporters to the Villa Borsig in Berlin in May 1993. Even at that early date 
we already had prominent participants, including former politicians, busi-
ness leaders, and civil society activists from Africa, Asia, and the Americas.
At that conference exactly 20 years ago we agreed on the name Trans-
parency International. Even though it sounded too tame for some of the 
participants at the meeting, it reflected the intention to cooperate with 
governments and business in the face of the technical complexities of cor-
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ruption—especially international grand corruption—where confrontation 
might interfere with the need for finding joint solutions. We also agreed 
on three basic principles for our work:
1. a holistic approach to improving systems against corruption;
2.  noninvestigation of individual cases of corruption for exposure; 
and 
3. mobilization of civil society in the affected countries and regions 
to diagnose their own problems and to design and implement 
the necessary reforms.
These three principles served TI well and are still the three tenets of our 
work worldwide.
This rather technocratic approach has to be understood in the context 
of the legal and political attitude toward international corruption at the 
time. It was considered destructive, ugly, even unethical, but was accepted 
as necessary and legal by the majority of governments in states where the 
bribes originated, as well as by business enterprises and even the academic 
community around the world. In a globalized economy without binding 
governance, this mercantilist position was considered legitimate—and 
our approach naive and unprofessional. We had to tread very carefully in 
order to survive.
1. The holistic approach was in stark contrast to the aims of most anticor-
ruption efforts, which focused mainly on punishment and sanctions. TI 
recognized that prevention and positive incentives were just as important. 
We saw that a system to protect society against corruption had to have 
many diverse elements, such as procurement rules, access to information 
requirements, conflict-of-interest standards, political financing rules, even 
the value systems of society as taught in faith-based organizations and 
schools. Criminal sanctions are only one arrow in the quiver, and a relatively 
blunt weapon for that matter, because under most civilized criminal law 
systems the barriers of due process against punishment are very high. As a 
result, business leaders find the risk of blacklisting by the World Bank or 
from lucrative government contracts more onerous than criminal sanctions 
with their high burden of proof.
Very early on, TI began to establish the most important elements of 
integrity systems—we called them pillars of integrity—into Integrity 
Systems Source Books for use by our members in their fight against cor-
ruption. These pillars were quasi checklists for diagnosing the strengths 
and weaknesses of a country’s integrity system. National Integrity System 
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Reviews were carried out in many countries. The same approach could be 
used to look at the integrity systems of provinces, of municipalities, even 
of sectors—for example, the health sector in the province of Cordoba.
2. The noninvestigation of individual cases for exposure has become a rather 
controversial policy. After all, the naming and shaming of the corrupt was 
seen by many as one of the most effective tools for fighting corruption. 
Our fear was that we would be victimized by harassment, threats, and libel 
suits all over the world. We also felt that some of the corrupt arrangements 
in international trade and investment were so complex that we needed the 
cooperation of the major players in this arena to effectively tackle them—
albeit an occasionally antagonistic cooperation.
Soon TI noticed that a total abstention from focusing on individual cases 
could turn it into a toothless tiger, and over time various ways to feature 
individual cases, particularly those in the public domain, became more 
accepted, as its growing reputation and political strength provided the 
necessary confidence for cautiously opening this battle ground. However, 
this still did not change our intention to cooperate as much as possible 
with governments, international organizations, and business, as long as the 
independence of TI could be clearly protected. We were often criticized 
for this cooperation by other, more confrontational CSOs.
For instance, when I worked with Siemens and other global companies on 
analyzing and controlling international corruption, scorn was heaped on what 
another CSO called “offering a fig leaf” to the companies that would not 
change one bit despite their verbal commitments to help us in our campaign. 
Of course, when Siemens was caught in 2004 for large-scale international 
bribery, the voices of “we told you so” were raised, as if TI had been used 
by Siemens to continue their corrupt ways with impunity. In reality it was 
the other way around. Siemens and other powerful companies had helped 
TI to make the OECD Convention against Bribery of 1997 a reality. As I 
will describe later, without the open letter written by these companies to 
the Kohl government in 1997 demanding the signature by Germany of this 
convention, Germany and consequently also France, the United Kingdom, 
and other exporting countries would not have participated (see below on 
“Collective Action”). Without the convention, Germany would not have 
changed its permissive law in May 1999. On the basis of this law Siemens was 
prosecuted and eventually turned away from its earlier systemic corruption.
3. The mobilization of civil society in the affected countries in the form of 
national chapters is probably the most important structural feature of TI. 
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At the 1993 launch conference we decided that TI would not evaluate 
corruption in various countries and try to impose its proposed solutions 
from a global vantage point. Instead, we would try to empower participat-
ing societies to diagnose their own problems, design suitable reforms, and 
implement these, hopefully in cooperation with government and private 
sector actors in their countries. The global movement would support these 
efforts with tools such as the Integrity System Source Book mentioned 
above, information about anticorruption experiences worldwide, and other 
instruments. Regular meetings, workshops, conferences, and publications 
helped to build a movement of mutual exchange and support driven by 
national chapters across all continents.
An essential role was afforded to national chapters at one of the first 
annual membership meetings in Uganda. While the TI association had been 
founded on the basis of individual memberships, its charter was changed to 
make the national chapters the main decision-making body, electing the 
international board and its chair, deliberating on important policy issues 
and the annual budget. Individual members can only have up to one-third 
of the votes.
Today TI has 107 national chapters. They range from small advocacy 
groups without professional staff in some countries to chapters with thou-
sands of members and well-staffed secretariats in others. In spite of their 
diversity, they have to live up to minimum requirements, which are regu-
larly reviewed in a participatory accreditation process. With a budget of 
over 22 million euros in 2012, raised from a multitude of public and private 
donors, the international secretariat with about 180 international staff in 
Berlin supports the movement (Transparency International 2013).
Transparency International Fighting Corruption
Two decades ago we would not have dreamt of the impact of TI and the 
tangible changes in the corruption arena that we can see today. Looking 
back we have to recognize that many factors came together, including the 
opportune time at the end of the Cold War, courageous personalities and 
institutions, and a growing demand of the people for better governance. 
It is hard to imagine that only 15 years ago, the powerful governments of 
civilized countries and their intergovernmental organizations defended the 
systematic grand corruption of their citizens and companies outside their 
borders, thereby perverting decision making in the developing world—
leading to untold poverty, misery, conflicts, and violence.
9
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Today the UN and its agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, the 
regional development banks, and the governments of most countries have 
joined an often draconian fight against international corruption. In Germany 
alone, more than 100 criminal anticorruption cases are pending against 
some of the most powerful world companies. Several global and regional 
anticorruption conventions have been signed and ratified by a large majority 
of governments and their parliaments. In my humble opinion—and based 
on my practical experience—it was the advent of the power of organized 
civil society, including Transparency International which made this possible.
TI’s “Islands of Integrity”: Collective Action
Probably the most helpful idea in creating TI was our concept of “Islands 
of Integrity”: we recognized that it might be unrealistic to demand our 
supporters to stop bribing overnight, everywhere in the world, but that 
it might be feasible to identify relevant markets, actual competitive situa-
tions with only a limited number of competitors, where each one of them 
was afraid that the others were bribing. We felt that it would be feasible to 
arrange in such situations for a mutual commitment by all of them to stop 
bribing simultaneously. I knew from my work at the World Bank that often 
only five or ten companies were prequalified to bid for large infrastructure 
projects. Each of them should be willing not to bribe—if only they could 
be assured that their competitors would not bribe either.
Robert S. McNamara, the former president of the World Bank, was 
so enthusiastic about this concept that he came in 1993 to Berlin for the 
launch of TI. He called the Islands of Integrity concept the “exit route 
from the Prisoners’ Dilemma” in which the corrupt companies and their 
home governments had been caught: nobody dared to stop bribing uni-
laterally and potentially lose out in a generally corrupt global market. The 
Islands of Integrity—today we call it the “TI Integrity Pact” or “Collective 
Action”—was indeed the way out of this trap.
In fact, this became an important solution for a stalemate we reached 
at a decisive series of meetings with the business community. From 1995 
to 1997 we arranged three meetings at the Aspen Institute on the Wann-
see with about 20 leaders of German business—including top managers 
from Siemens, ABB, Lufthansa, Daimler, Schering, and others—to discuss 
international corruption and possible reforms. Richard von Weizsäcker, 
who had just ended his presidency of Germany, chaired the first meeting.
The first meeting ended badly: the company representatives claimed that 
what they were doing abroad was not corruption but legitimate business 
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acquisition—as customary in foreign markets with different legal systems 
and values. It was a sign of respect for other cultures and traditions not 
to impose Western mores on other societies. The second meeting a few 
months later was already marked by a growing awareness of the damage 
caused by grand corruption everywhere in the world. Also, a few scandals 
of international corruption had hit the media. Hence, there was some 
recognition that what the companies were doing abroad would be called 
corruption if it was done at home. But since everybody else was bribing in 
the world market, there was nothing one could do about it without untold 
damage to one’s business.
The third Aspen meeting in early 1997 brought the breakthrough: again, 
the company representatives professed that international corruption was 
causing a lot of damage, that they would like to stop and compete with 
their excellent products on a corruption-free market, but they could not 
unilaterally end this practice. It was at that point that the TI Integrity Pact 
was tabled. We promised to identify relevant markets where we would 
identify all competitors, arrange for a legally binding nonbribery pact, 
organize independent monitors—perhaps TI national chapters—and help 
design sanctions against breaches. These sanctions included blacklisting of 
defaulters, liquidated damages, or forfeiture of bid securities. Based on this 
proposal the business participants agreed to support TI.
In fact, they sent an open letter to the Kohl government, requesting that 
Germany support an effort by the OECD to stop the bribery of foreign 
officials. This effort, which TI had been supporting for a number of years, 
was in essence collective action at the global level: all OECD members 
and a number of other large exporters promising to stop bribing abroad.
The 1997 OECD Convention Against Bribery of Foreign Officials 
In the fall of 1997, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions was signed; 
it entered into force in early 1999. This marked a watershed in terms of 
fighting international corruption. It would not have been thinkable without 
the open letter sent by the German business community to its government. 
With the exception of a few supporters of our cause, the government had 
been openly hostile to any attempts to restrict foreign bribery. It was quite 
similar in other European countries: without the German initiative this 
powerful convention would never have seen the light of day.
Of course, there were other important contributing factors. Most impor-
tantly the president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, invited TI 
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leadership in the spring of 1996 to a full-day seminar with his top manag-
ers and began a process of turning this powerful institution from Saul to 
Paul, crowned by his annual speech in Hong Kong about the “Cancer of 
Corruption.” Since then the Bretton Woods institutions have been strong 
supporters of the anticorruption agenda.
Similarly, the UN agencies, regional organizations including the Euro-
pean Union, and a number of national governments—and in particular their 
development agencies—rapidly supported a global anticorruption agenda.
But the task of civil society organizations like TI was not yet over. 
The signatory states of the OECD convention did not all implement and 
enforce their legal commitment to criminalize foreign bribery and actually 
translate these new rules into action. As the regular monitoring reports by 
TI indicate, some countries dragged their feet in punishing foreign bribery 
by their companies (Transparency International 2013).
While a few countries, such as Japan, have done practically nothing to 
introduce effective laws against foreign bribery by their citizens, others, 
including the United States (which continued, of course, the long tradition 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977), Germany, and most recently 
the United Kingdom and France, apply rigorous systems of punishing 
foreign bribery. CSOs, and notably the national chapters of TI, played an 
effective role in nudging their governments toward compliance.
In the United Kingdom, for instance, CSOs sued the government because 
it had stopped investigations by the Serious Fraud Office of major corrup-
tion cases of BAE abroad; this was widely seen as a breach of its obligations 
under the OECD Convention. Draconian rules have now been introduced 
and are being implemented in the United Kingdom.
In Germany the prosecution of foreign bribery also started slowly. By 
now the record has become quite good: more than 100 companies, some of 
them major players internationally, including Siemens, MAN, Ferrostahl, 
and others, are being prosecuted. Unfortunately, the German record is being 
spoiled by the refusal of the members of the Bundestag to ratify the UN 
Convention against Corruption—mainly because it would mean giving up 
an odd privilege of German parliamentarians to be bribed with impunity.
Other TI Anticorruption Tools
One of the most powerful tools Transparency International has is the 
annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI). In 2012 it ranked 174 coun-
tries according to perceived levels of public sector corruption in countries 
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worldwide. Based on expert opinions countries are scored from 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Two-thirds of the countries score below 50, 
which means that public institutions have to become more transparent 
and accountable.
The CPI was created in 1995 more or less by coincidence, when a young 
PhD candidate, Johann von Lambsdorff, working as an intern at our small 
international secretariat, attempted to quantify measurements of corrup-
tion. After discussing it off the record with a journalist it appeared with 
initially 54 countries in a prominent German weekly. We had to choose 
if we wanted to disown our intern or embrace the index as an imperfect 
but very effective tool. It has served us well in helping to build public 
awareness for corruption.
Numerous other indices, including national, regional, sectorial percep-
tion indices and the powerful public opinion survey, the Global Corruption 
Barometer, developed over time. They force governments, companies, media, 
and people generally to take notice of corruption, a first step towards 
controlling it.
Other tools that have come into use since 2001 include the Global Cor-
ruption Reports series. This comprises comprehensive status reports about 
the fight against corruption, each one with a special theme, like political 
corruption, corruption in procurement, in the health sector, in the judiciary; 
in 2013 the focus was on education.
Since 1997, TI has been responsible for organizing the biannual Inter-
national Anti-Corruption Conferences, which help build global networks 
against corruption, with participants learning from each other and driving 
the frontier of anticorruption forward. At the last conference, in November 
2012, 1,900 people from over 140 countries gathered for four days in Brazil. 
They came from politics, business, civil society, the media, and academia. 
The Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, struggling with widespread cor-
ruption in her own country, opened the meeting.
One tool was created 10 years ago and has become particularly effective. 
The advocacy and legal advice centers (ALACs) offer free and confidential 
legal advice to witnesses and victims of corruption and thereby help citi-
zens break their silence around corruption. Today 90 ALACs operate in 
60 countries; more than 140,000 individuals have contacted TI’s centers.
An untold number of tools and anticorruption instruments are at work, 
mainly developed by the over 100 TI national chapters. The international 
secretariat supports and coordinates this highly innovative work while also 
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focusing on global and regional tools, including the Corruption Percep-
tions Index and the Global Corruption Reports, as well as articulating a 
coherent strategy and presenting a global voice of the movement in the 
international arena.
Many of these evolving tools have a sectorial focus—for example, corrup-
tion in the health sector, in education, in water and sanitation, in forestry 
and land use, in local government, in business, in arms trade and security. 
(There are too many such tools and instruments to list here; they may be 
found at www.transparency.org).
But there is one sectorial initiative worth singling out because of the 
unique opportunities and also challenges involved in this sector: extractive 
industries, including oil and gas, mining, forestry, and fisheries. This is also 
an initiative that serves well as a tangible illustration of the main argument of 
this paper: the strength of the triangular cooperation between government, 
business, and civil society in dealing with intractable governance issues.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
The extractive industries sector, in particular oil and gas and mining, 
is one of the sectors most vulnerable to corruption. The investments are 
huge, commitment periods are very long, and the technical, commercial, 
and political risks are considerable. On the other hand, the potential for 
natural resource development to become an engine of inclusive growth 
and development, particularly in poor countries, is very attractive. But 
the record of the industry is poor. TI and other CSOs therefore felt that a 
special approach would be needed to promote transparency and account-
ability for extractive industries.
Transparency International UK joined a group of active CSOs stationed 
in London, including Global Witness, Oxfam, and Human Rights Watch, 
to demand extractive industry companies to publish what they pay in taxes, 
royalties, dividends, signature bonuses, and other transfers to the govern-
ments in their resource-rich host countries. These amounts are huge, but 
in many countries kept out of sight of the parliaments, the media, and 
civil society, making it difficult to hold the power elites in these countries 
accountable for these riches.
A number of companies, like BP, Shell Oil, Anglo American, and Vale, 
agreed in principle to making these flows open. Around 2001 though, 
some of their host countries (for example, Angola) prohibited their publica-
tion, reminding the operators of confidentiality clauses in their investment 
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agreements, with the veiled threat to terminate the production rights in 
case of breach. We therefore nearly accepted with resignation that our idea 
had failed. However, in the meantime the World Bank, the IMF, DFID, 
and some powerful politicians, such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
various private entrepreneurs, like Mark Moody-Stuart, and philanthropists, 
like George Soros, had begun to support this campaign. We continued the 
idea—but changed our approach to also challenging the host governments 
to allow the release of these data.
The breakthrough came in 2003, at the tenth anniversary of TI, when 
President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria announced at a large university 
lecture in Berlin that his country would not only allow the publication of 
payments to the Nigerian government but would even make it mandatory 
for all companies operating there, and that the government itself would 
report all its revenues from extractive industries. This was the green light 
for a conference in 2003 in London where the Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative Principles (EITI) were agreed upon.
In the subsequent multistakeholder advisory group meetings, rules 
were drawn up to ensure that all participating countries committed to a 
minimum level of transparency in reporting payments by companies and 
revenues received by governments. The group completed its work in the 
fall of 2005, when a global conference in Oslo launched the initiative. In 
the meantime 40 implementing countries, from Azerbaijan to Nigeria and 
Indonesia, have submitted, through their own national multistakeholder 
working groups, regular reports, scrutinized by validators for the approval 
of the multistakeholder global board.
The rules have evolved. A major development was the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Act into law in the United Sates in 2010. Its provision in Sec-
tion 1504 go beyond the EITI standards, prescribing mandatory informa-
tion, on a project-by-project, country-by-country basis for all companies 
listed in the United States, about the billions of dollars they pay to govern-
ments across the world.
The Dodd-Frank Act has catalyzed global action. The European Union 
recently adopted guidelines that match the US statute. Similar rules are 
being developed in Canada, France, Norway, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. But despite the potential for payment transparency rules to 
control international corruption, the American Petroleum Institute—an 
oil industry lobby group—has successfully challenged the guidelines of the 
Dodd-Frank Act by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
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specifying how companies should comply with the Act. A US court ruled 
that the SEC must review its implementing rules and reissue them with a 
fuller justification for its decisions.
The EITI rules have also been expanded: while in the past they had 
been implemented in a relatively narrow fashion focused merely on the 
payments made and received for extractive industry operations, the 2013 
EITI membership meeting in Sydney decided to require that national 
EITI reports should be better grounded in national priorities and reforms. 
Under the new requirements, “the reports must contain basic contextual 
information about the fiscal regime, contractual framework, production, 
licensing procedures, revenue allocations and expenditures” (Short 2013). 
This information will help to broaden the enabling environment for extrac-
tive industries in the future.
These additions are the result of nearly two years of consultations by the 
EITI board and its partners in governments, business, and organized civil 
society. They represent a significant step toward creating a global coherent 
standard in this vital but challenging sector, which none of the three actors 
would have been able to achieve alone.
Coalitions of State, Private Sector, and Civil Society for Good 
Governance 
From our experience in fighting international corruption it is evident that 
a coalition of the three actors of governance—the state as prime actor, the 
commercial sector, and civil society organizations—can offer solutions in 
important areas of failing governance related to integrity and accountability.
It is safe to conclude that the same coalition can also address other 
issues of failing governance, such as protecting the environment, address-
ing climate change, fighting violations of human rights, and establishing 
fair labor standards. The three actors have to complement each other in 
diagnosing problems together, developing joint proposals for reform, and 
introducing and monitoring these reforms in order to establish together 
better governance worldwide.
This is widely and increasingly recognized: a free and vigilant civil 
society is essential if we are to tackle poverty and the injustice of economic 
globalization, and to dispel the climate of despair and alienation that serves 
as a breeding ground for conflict, war, and terrorism. However, to take on 
this responsibility, organized civil society also has to change. There are at 
least four major challenges for many CSOs to grow into this role:
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First, the decision-making processes of CSOs themselves, and generally 
their governance, have to improve: Are they open and participatory? Are 
they democratic?
Second, financial transparency, the openness and accounting for their 
funds, the identity and accountability of their financial supporters—all of 
these have to be clear and transparent. Can this be left to self-regulation? 
Or should the state set the minimum requirements? The examples of severe 
restrictions placed on civil society in Russia and China argue for caution 
in this field.
Third, the competence and professionalism of the leaders and activ-
ists in CSOs have to be strengthened. This is a challenge to academia: 
research and training for CSOs through focused curricula and based on 
close interaction is essential. The establishment of numerous research and 
training centers for civil society in the United States and Europe is cause 
for optimism in this area.
Finally, CSOs have to learn the art of being open to coalition building, 
a willingness to cooperate with the other actors of governance, without 
losing their independence.
In addition, there are numerous other obstacles that must be overcome 
in order for CSOs to become partners with the other actors of governance. 
There is for instance a huge gap between the large international advocacy 
NGOs (INGOs), some with annual budgets of more than a billion dol-
lars, and their small local relatives at the grassroots level in the villages and 
rural areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. And yet they also depend 
on each other.
The governance problems of CSOs are addressed through a number 
of important initiatives. For example, since 2006 the Accountability 
Charter for INGOs has been administered by the Berlin Civil Society 
Center (now renamed the International Civil Society Center) with the 
support of the Global Reporting Initiative and addresses through a vol-
untary code of conduct the most important elements of CSO governance 
(www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org). Other similar initiatives give reason 
to expect that organized civil society will grow into its role as a driving 
force for a new paradigm of global governance.
An effective coalition of state and business and civil society is bringing 
transparency and accountability to global governance in the fight against 
international corruption. The hope is that it can also bring solutions to 
other ills of globalization, which is now marked by injustice and inequity, 
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poverty, violence, conflict, environmental destruction, and climate change. 
With this magical triangle of cooperation, there is hope for a better, more 
just world for everybody.
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